abstract: The universal concepts of sociology are those that form the basic foundation of the discipline found in all human societies and valid for all times. Examples are the concepts of sanction, class, social stratification, social mobility, group, culture, values, religion, custom and others. These concepts are universally valid in the general and abstract sense but their historical and concrete manifestations are conditioned by their temporal, spatial and cultural frameworks. It is in the studies of these unique historical phenomena that the autonomous tradition has its roots. What is lacking in the non-western world is an autonomous social science tradition, generated and developed by local scholars, guided by the selection of problems from within the society, applying an independent concept of relevance in the collection and accumulation of research data and comparative attention to problems outside the country or region.
planners of the former colonial territories and even in the few countries that had remained independent during that period (Alatas, 1981) .
This problem is the emergence of imitative thinking arising from overdependence on the western intellectual contribution in the various fields of knowledge, not so much at the practical level of the applied sciences, but at the level of intellectual reflections, planning, conceptualization and the need to establish a genuine and autonomous scientific tradition. We confine ourselves here to the autonomous social science tradition, namely sociology, and the relation to its universal foundation. By universal, we mean that which is valid throughout human society. By autonomous, we mean the particular social phenomenon valid only in one particular area or shared among certain societies such as the use of chopsticks or a knife and fork for eating. The categories universal and particular have many forms and levels embracing all spheres of living.
The universal concepts of sociology are those that form the basic foundation of the discipline found in all human societies and valid at all times, such as the concepts of sanction, the class, social stratification, social mobility, group, culture, values, religion, custom and many others. These concepts have been continuously increased. Max Weber had contributed significantly in this area with his concept of the ideal type. So has Mannheim in the field of social analysis, with for instance his concepts of ideology and utopia.
These concepts are universally valid in the general and abstract sense but their historical and concrete manifestations are conditioned by their temporal, spatial and cultural frameworks. The sociological concept of the revolution applies to all revolutions in human societies, but the American, the French and the Russian Revolutions were unique, individual, concrete entities.
It is in the studies of these unique historical phenomena that the autonomous tradition has its roots. The general concepts of revolution, the elites, the ruling class, the mob, the masses, the intellectuals, the general laws of historical causation and many other universal concepts were applied interwoven with the particular events and conditions resulting in the autonomous emergence of that particular analysis of the revolution in question.
In the western world, the autonomous tradition is decisive and vigorous and the demarcation line between general universal sociology and the autonomous studies of subjects peculiar to specific western countries is clearly observed. Contents of studies of revolution in general are not automatically and uncritically applied to the study of the French or American Revolution. For instance, I have not come across an American historical study using the concept of the ancient regime, which de Tocqueville used in his book The Ancient Regime, discussing the French Revolution and its background, the regime overthrown by the revolution of 1789.
What I would like to stress here, is that there is truly a genuine and autonomous tradition in western historical, sociological and other socialscientific disciplines. Both the general universal social science thinking and the autonomous application to a specific problem area have not been imitative and uncritical conceptually and methodologically. This is to be distinguished from committing errors in analysis and in the choice of methodology or in interpretation and conclusion. Again, I do not suggest that objectivity is always maintained, the studies are perfect, always up to the mark. I am not passing judgement on the objectivity and achievement of western scholarship. I am only stressing the autonomous tradition containing both the results of truth and error in its cumulative achievement.
The reason why the autonomous tradition in western sociology has been able to flourish so vigorously had to do with developments in European history. The idea of sociology as a science or discipline did not originate in the West, but sociological thinking with a collective response by a group of thinkers eventually entering mainstream intellectual discourse and later crystallizing into a modern discipline of its own originated in the West in the 19th century. Some suggest the 18th century. However, the separation of social thinking from social philosophy came very much around the turn of the 20th century.
The discovery of sociology as a science to study human society was made by Abd aI-Rahman Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406 AD), the Muslim historian, sociologist, judge, diplomat and reformer, who was born in Tunis and died in Cairo. He originated from Hadramaut in South Yemen. His works had generally been ignored in the Muslim world, except in Turkey during the late Ottoman period. The real discovery and subsequent attention on Ibn Khaldun occurred in the West, by both historian and sociologist. Following Robert Flint, a historian of the philosophy of history, in 1893, other scholars such as A. Gumplowicz. Appreciation of Ibn Khaldun had come from a spectrum of European scholars -Italian, French, Polish, German, British, Spanish and Dutch -as well as American. To the present day, serious and increasing attention is paid to Ibn Khaldun in the West but scarcely so in the Muslim world, though there has been some focus on him in the Middle East, namely Egypt.
I do not plan to discuss in detail the contribution of Ibn Khaldun, his theory, conceptualization and methodology. What is of interest here is the birth of an autonomous beginning of sociology conforming to its comprehensive requirements. It was a sociology born out of a historical setting unimpeded by the domination of a hegemonic external intellectual tradition from a previous colonial power. This is the same with the birth of modem sociology in the West, free from domination by an external hegemonic influence. Both were not obstructed by imitative thinking, and both were not under the spell of globalization.
Today, we are in a different situation in the non-western world. I am using western and non-western not in a pejorative or divisive sense but in a purely descriptive and nominative sense. I am also not pleading for any type of autonomous tradition. Nor am I politicizing or emotionalizing the issue to cultivate a pro-or anti-western stance. With strong reasons, I believe the western sociological tradition as the definitive reference point for departure and progress in the development of sociology, the autonomous and the universal.
To make this clear, I would like to avoid and reject the notion of indigenization as opposed to autonomous development of sociology, or any science for that matter. Indigenization has a different connotation. In principle, a science cannot be indigenized. Only its application can. In the method of curing malaria with modern medical science after successive generations, the old traditional method is replaced and forgotten and the new one takes its place to the point that it is felt as part of that society, of its indigenous identity, a culturally interwoven entity, the method blended with the cultural, in the actual practical operation.
Scientific thinking, however, is different. Its characteristic is to break away from the indigenous tradition mould. Science is autonomous from the traditional cultural background. Every great scientific breakthrough is a rupture with the previous outlook on the subject in question. Take arithmetic: the statement that 2 X 2 = 4 cannot be indigenized. We can indigenize the script and the numeral system but not the concept. The concept has an independent existence and growth in our mind. It does not possess a concrete existence by itself but is always tied to a concrete object. In the concrete reality, two is always two objects, two trees, two goals, two houses, two graves, etc. etc.
Indigenization can only mean the distortion and mutilation of the sciences, similar to the politicization of the sciences. How does one indigenize a science such as sociology? First let me describe what is meant by an autonomous social science tradition and then compare it with indigenization. Basically, it is the linking of social science research and thinking to specifically regional problems selected by regional scholars, including smaller constituents of the region such as Europe or Spain. 1 Here the western world has given the most instructive and sophisticated example, both in its scope and depth. Though den Hollander's interest was in the sociology of knowledge applied to American and European scholarship, his related observations around the theme constitute the materials for an autonomous tradition and devote attention to the regional problems selected by scholars from that region. This selection process is conditioned by the factor of relevance.
It was pointed out by den Hollander, citing Dahrendorf, that American sociology has been selective in assimilating European influence. In this intellectual traffic, certain ideas and concepts have been more or less systematically neglected despite the fact that it continues to absorb the interest of European sociologists:
In directing their attention to European sociologists and their works, Americans have, till quite recently, greatly, greatly preferred such theories and concepts that fitted in with their prevailing orientation of dynamic conservatism and have neglected those aspects of European social thinking which might be interpreted to have more radical implications. (Den Hollander, 1971: 204) As Dahrendorf pointed out, de Tocqueville was received rather than Marx, Spencer rather than Pareto, Max Weber rather than Sorel, Tonnies and Durkheim rather than Mosca and Michels, Malinowski rather than Levy-Bruhl. Within the works of these chosen authors, there was further operation of the selective principles. General ideas central to European
